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 Abstract 
Decoupled payments were thought to have minimal impacts on current production decisions and 
input use. However, the literature has identified several mechanisms through which decoupled 
payments become coupled. We analyze the effects of uncertainty regarding future policy changes 
on farm-level production decisions and input use, focusing on farmers’ expectations of base 
acreage and yield updating. Using farm-level data, we find positive relationships between both 
decoupled and other government payments and real per acre expenditures on agricultural 
chemicals. Furthermore, there is evidence that decoupled payments may affect the intensive 
margin more than other government payments.  
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I.  Introduction   
  When first introduced, decoupled support policies were thought to have minimal impacts 
on current production decisions and input use since they are based on historic acreage and yields 
rather than current production, prices, or inputs (Alston & Hurd, 1990; Blandford, de Gorter, and 
Harvey, 1989; Borges & Thurman, 1994; Rucker, Thurman, & Sumner, 1995; and Sumner & 
Wolf, 1996). However, several mechanisms by which decoupled payments have the potential to 
alter production decisions in the current period have been identified in the literature.  For 
example, uncertainty regarding the ability to update base acreage and yields upon which 
decoupled payments are calculated can influence current production decisions, leading to 
increased acreage (affecting the extensive margin) or altering the product mix or input mix 
(affecting the intensive margin).  
Decoupled payments were first introduced to U.S. agricultural policy with the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act in 1996, which began implementing 
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments to farm operators based on historic acreage and 
yields.  These subsidies were introduced to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
obligations outlined in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) requiring a 
reduction in trade-distorting agricultural support.  Direct payments were continued in subsequent 
Farm Bills. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI) gave farmers the option 
of updating their base acreage and yields, essentially allowing farmers to change the historical 
acreage and yield upon which their decoupled payments were based. The Food, Conservation, 
and Energy Act of 2008 (FCE) continued decoupled payments but gave farmers the option of 
foregoing a portion of their direct payments to obtain Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program payments based on both national market price and state average yields. The 2008 Farm 2 
Bill permitted farmers to adjust base acreage once again to allow for the addition of newly 
covered commodities.    
  Several mechanisms by which decoupled payments may have the potential to influence 
current production decisions have been identified since their introduction to U.S. policy.  Direct 
payments may alter the farmer’s set of risk preferences due to insurance and wealth effects 
(Hennessy, 1998), ease credit constraints by increasing total wealth (Burfisher & Hopkins, 2004; 
Goodwin & Mishra, 2006), and change allocations of land, labor and other inputs (Ahearn, El-
Osta, & Dewbre, 2006; Kirwan, 2009). In addition, there is evidence that agricultural decoupled 
subsidies keep farms in production that would otherwise exit the market, leading to inflated 
aggregate production (Chau & deGorter, 2005; deGorter, Just & Kropp, 2008).   
  Furthermore, decoupled payments may indirectly affect current production through 
uncertainty of future government payments and expectations of those payments. This is 
especially true if updating of base acres and yields is allowed such as it was in the 2002 and 2008 
Farm Bills.  Goodwin and Mishra (2006) show that uncertainty regarding future decoupled 
payments affects the optimal allocation of acreage amongst crops planted.  Furthermore, Bhaskar 
and Beghin (2010) show that if a farmer believes that he might be allowed to update his base 
acreage or yields in the future, then he has the incentive to increase his plantings in the current 
period. This ultimately leads to a change in aggregate production and/or a change in the types 
and quantities of inputs used in production. 
  Moreover, some agricultural inputs are known to have negative environmental impacts, 
particularly the use of fertilizer, herbicides and insecticides.  Previous research has found that 
decoupled payments change input decisions with possible environmental consequences (Orazem 
& Miranowski, 1994; Wu, 1999; Adams et al., 2001).  Our paper contributes to this area of 3 
growing research by analyzing the impacts of decoupled payments on the use of agricultural 
chemicals in the presence of uncertainty of base acreage and yield updating.  We find a positive 
relationship between both decoupled and other government payments and per acre expenditures 
on agricultural chemicals.  In addition, we find evidence that decoupled payments may affect 
agricultural chemical use (the intensive margin) more than other government payments. 
Summary of U.S. decoupled payment programs 
The 1996 FAIR Act eliminated many supply controls on field crops and introduced 
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC).  Farms producing wheat, feed grains (corn, barley, grain, 
sorghum, and oats), rice, and upland cotton were allowed a one-time enrollment for a seven-year 
contract where eligibility was dependent on participation in a production adjustment program 
between 1991 and 1995
1.  PFC payments were determined by the crop specific payment rate, 
yield, and base acres in a historic planting period (Young & Shields, 1996). However, producers 
were free to plant any crops (with limitations on fruits, vegetables and specialty crops) on their 
historical acres, allowing for more flexibility in the mix of commodities planted as well as the 
total acreage planted.  For example, a farm could receive a payment based on historic oat acreage 
but currently plant only wheat and corn.  
In the 2002 FSRI Act, PFC were replaced with fixed direct payments (FDP) that were 
similar to PFC. FDP were expanded to include soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts
2 (ERS, 
2002; Young & Shields, 1996), allowing farmers with historic acreage in those commodities to 
update their payment acreage and yields to allow for these newly covered commodities. The 
FSRI Act also allowed farmers to chose the way their total base acres and yields were calculated.  
                                                 
1 The production adjustment program was from the 1990 Farm Bill. 
2 Special provisions are made concerning peanuts. 4 
Farmers could now choose to have their payment yield calculated one of three ways. Two 
additional ways to determine base acreage were also introduced.   
The 2002 FSRI Act also introduced counter-cyclical payments (CCP) as another form of 
income support, replacing the Market Loss Assistance (MLA) Program
3 introduced in 1998 as a 
supplement to the FAIR Act.  Like PFC and fixed direct payments, CCP are based on historic, 
not current, production.  The primary difference between the two types of policies is that CCP 
are only instituted when the effective price is less than the target price set in the FSRI Act and 
therefore is only “partially” decoupled as CCP are still linked to current prices (ERS, 2008). 
The newest decoupled policy was introduced in the 2008 FCE Act.  Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) provides participants with a guaranteed revenue flow that is based on 
both national market price and state average yields.  Farmers are given direct payments totaling 
90 percent of the product of the ‘five-year benchmark state yield’ and the ‘two-year ACRE 
program guarantee price.’  The ACRE benchmark state yield is a commodity and state specific 
measure of the fitted average yield per planted acre; the ACRE program guarantee price is a 
national commodity specific two-year average market price (ERS, 2008).  If ACRE revenue for 
the state and farm is less than the program guarantee and the benchmark farm, participants 
receive a payment (ERS, 2008).  Producers enrolled in ACRE must remain enrolled until 2012 
and are not eligible for CCP.  Enrollment in ACRE also reduces all fixed direct payments to the 
farm by 20 percent.  The program covers wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats, upland cotton, 
rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, peanuts, dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas, and large chickpeas. 
                                                 
3 Classification of MLA payments is disputed: Burfisher and Hopkins (2004) suggest MLA’s are tied to market price 
and therefore fully coupled and would be classified within the Amber Box, while Adams et al. (2001) analyze MLA 
payments side-by-side PFC payments as fully decoupled. 5 
The ACRE program differs from previous support programs because the payments are 
based on moving average yields and price, not a set time period as is seen with PFC and 
FDP.  Because producers base their decision to participate in ACRE on the historic and expected 
variability in prices, the program works as a partially decoupled policy similar to CCP.  Both 
ACRE and CCP are viewed as insurance programs linked to price.  
  With each new Farm Bill, changes in the way payment acres and payment yields are 
calculated permit farmers to update their base acreage and yield.  Ultimately, updating base 
and/or yield affects the future value of payments due to participation in the support program.  If a 
farmer comes to expect updating every seven to ten years, he or she may change production now 
to increase the payout in the future.  This is demonstrated more formally in the next section.  
II.  Theory 
  We assume that farmers maximize their expected utility of wealth, including farm profits 
and off-farm income.  Furthermore, farmers will allocate both acreage and other inputs to 
maximize profit.  Equation (1) illustrates the expected utility maximization problem of a typical 
farmer where both acreage A and quantity of inputs X are choice variables.  Let E be the 
expectation operator over the random variables, output prices and yields, and   be a concave 
continuously differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function suggesting farmers are 
risk averse.    
(1)   
s.t.    
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  where   
     
     
    . 
The function  is the sum of the profit function  , income from off-farm activities at time 
t, Iit, and a measure of initial wealth in time t-1, Wt-1.  The Discount factor is  .  Profit is 
specified as the difference of costs and revenue plus decoupled government payments,   
and decoupled lump sum government payments,  .   
  Revenue is the summation of the product of price, yield, and acres planted summed over  
i crops, where Pit is the price of the i
th crop at time t, Ψit is the yield per acre of crop i at time t 
subject to land quality φ, and Ait is acres planted of the i
th crop at time t.  Fully coupled price 
supports PSit are the sum of all per-unit production subsidies and deficiency payments at price 
Pit.   
  Costs are a summation of fixed and variable costs associated with each crop i.  The cost 
of input j associated with the i
th crop at time t is the product of ωijt, the unit cost of input j, and 
Xijt, the amount of input j associated with i
th crop at time t.  Let rit be the per-acre cost of land 
associated with the i
th crop at time t.  Thus, rit  can represent the per acre rental rate of land to the 
tenant for the i
th crop at time t or the opportunity cost associated with using that acre for the next 
best use if the land is owned.  Cit are fixed costs associated with the i
th crop at time t and are a 7 
function of production decisions in the previous time period, meaning that acreage decisions are 
inter-temporal.   
  Direct decoupled payments (e.g., fixed direct payments, production flexibility contracts) 
are represented by equation  and are a function of an αit percentage of Sit the payment rate 
per crop, historic yield   per crop i, and base acres Bit for each crop i  summed over the i 
crops.  Historic yield is a function of the production function in a historic time period H.  Base 
acres are a function of historic acreage AH.  Thus, decoupled direct payments are not a function 
of current prices, production, or inputs.  Within  , the only variables that vary with time t 
relate to the amount of support   each farmer receives, which depends on the policy in place 
at that time.   
  The function   introduces a term from Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) that allows for the 
future policy benefits to depend on whether or not updating actually occurs and accounts for the 
farmer’s expectation of updating occurring.  Let   be the farmer’s subjective probability 
of future base and/or yield updating.  If  , a farmer is certain that updating will be not 
allowed in future policies.  If  , a farmer is 100 percent certain that base updating will be 
allowed in future farm policies.  The function   is discounted at by the discount factor  , 
where  corresponds to the time period in which the future payment benefits are realized. 
VB is defined as the value of the payment if updating occurs, and VNB is the value of the 
payment if updating does not occur.  If no updating is the true state of the world, then VNB is 
awarded.  Conversely, if updating is the true state of the world, then VB is awarded.   
  The farmer’s utility maximization problem has three constraints: first, the farmer is 
constrained by the technology he employs.  Hence, output, , is a function of all inputs Xijt, 8 
acres planted Ait, and a stochastic element εit allowing for exogenous variants such as weather.   
Second, the sum of total acres planted of the i crops must be less than or equal total acres 
operated.  It is possible to optimize profit by having idle acreage Aidle.  Thus, if both harvested 
acreage and idle acreage are included in the profit maximization model, then the constraint binds.  
Lastly, the farmer’s subjective probability of updating is constrained to be between 0 and 1.     
  Production decisions are made with output price, yield and policy uncertainty.  Xijt and Ait 
are choice variables and all other variable are exogenous.  Costs from inputs are assumed known 
when acreage decisions are made because most costs are sustained at planting.  Thus, within the 
profit function, uncertainty lies within revenue, not costs.  Hence, yield and price are treated as 
random variables.  Furthermore, total acreage planted is not fixed across time because farmers 
can buy, rent, or lease more land. 
  Without loss of generality, equations (2) and (3) below illustrate the necessary first order 
conditions corresponding to the farmer’s utility maximization problem summarized in equation 
(1).  Equation (2) consists of two parts: the first term is the standard profit maximizing condition 
where the value of the marginal product associated with input j is equal to its price, ωijt, (note 
that the value of the marginal product is a function of both output price and price supports) for 
each time t, crop i, and input j. The second term is due to updating. Note that the two terms have 
different discount factors since the farmer receives part of the benefit in time t and part of the 
benefits in time  . Equation (3) consists of three terms. First, the value of the marginal product is 
equal to the rental rate rit, for each time t and crop i. The third term is due to updating, while the 
middle term captures the inter-temporal nature of acreage decisions.     
(2)    9 
(3)    
  If  , then the terms included for to account for the farmer’s expectations of updating 
in Equations (2) and (3) become zero and decoupled payments are not coupled to production.  
However, if farmers have a non-zero subjective probability of updating, there is a link between 
decoupled payments and current input use and acreage decisions; the greater γ, the greater the 
link between current acreage and input decisions and future program crop payments (Bhaskar & 
Beghin, 2010).  Based on findings of Coble, Miller, and Hudson (2008), it is expected that 
will be true for some, but not all farmers
4.  If a farmer expects updating to occur, either through 
government policy changes or the implicit policy design (in the case of ACRE), he or she may 
alter current farm production decisions in order to optimize future profits.  The first order 
conditions allow decoupled payments to impact production decisions through increased acreage 
(extensive margin), changes in the mix of crops produced, or through changes in input use 
(intensive margin).   
The fully coupled nature of price supports is also seen in the first order conditions. 
Acreage and input decisions depend not only on market prices, but the government price support 
PSit as well.  Lump-sum government payments Gt do not appear in either Equation (2) or (3), 
indicating that they do not influence production decisions.   
  Therefore, we expect positive relationships between the use of agricultural chemicals and 
both decoupled and coupled governments payments.  Although we expect the relationship 
between both decoupled and other governments payments and agricultural chemical use to be 
                                                 
4 In a 2005 survey conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Survey (NASS), about 40 percent of 
respondents from Iowa and Mississippi expected base acreage and yield updating would be allowed in the 2008 
Farm Bill. 10 
positive, the magnitude of the effect of decoupled direct payments may be greater than or less 
than coupled government payments depending on the size of coupled price supports (PSit), 
decoupled farm subsidies ( ), and the discount rate δ. This hypothesis is tested in the next 
section using weighted ordinary least squares regression analysis. 
III.  Empirics 
Data 
Cross-sectional data collected annually by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is 
used in the analysis.  From 1984 to 1995 Farm Cost and Returns Surveys (FCRS) were collected 
from a representative sampling of farmers; in 1996 these surveys were replaced with the 
Agricultural Resource and Management Survey (ARMS).  Data from 1991 to 2008 is used in this 
paper to identify changes in the use of fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals due to the initial 
implementation of decoupled direct payments in 1996 with the passing of the FAIR Act and/or 
policy changes in 2002 (FSRI Act) and 2008 (FCE).  Data from 1991 to 1995 are obtained from 
FCRS and data from 1996 to 2008 are obtained from the Farm Structure and Finance (Phase III) 
ARMS.  These data sources were selected because they contain information on government 
payments, value of production, output, input expenses, and other farm and farmer characteristics 
at the farm-level.   
  ARMS and FCRS data have known sampling weights.  Each observation is given a 
weight reflecting the probability of being selected; therefore, whole population estimations can 
be constructed using a much smaller sample size than would otherwise be required. All results 
are obtained using the appropriate weights. 
  We limit our analysis to those farms with more than more than 50 percent of their total 
value of production coming from program crop commodities because decoupled direct payments 11 
are paid to farmers with historic plantings of the eleven program crops.  Therefore, any farmer 
with more than half of their total value of production coming from the following commodities is 
included in the analysis: general cash grain, wheat, corn, soybean, sorghum, rice, cotton, peanut, 
and other.  General grain crops refer to farms that are not specializing in a specific crop, but the 
sum of barley, corn, oats, rice, sorghum, soybean and wheat makes up at least half of all sales 
revenue.  Oilseeds and pulse crops (e.g., lentils, peas, and chick peas) are categorized under 
‘other.’ 
  We further limit our analysis to the Heartland region as defined by USDA.  This region 
spans 543 counties in nine states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota.  However, only three of the states (Indiana, Illinois, and 
Iowa) are wholly contained in the Heartland.  The other six states only have some counties 
included in the Heartland, while the other parts of the state are categorized in a different region.  
Since the current regional classifications were not developed until 1995 and regional data 
therefore does not exist prior to 1995, this analysis focuses on an extended Heartland region 
encompassing all counties located in the nine states listed above.  The Heartland was chosen 
because it boasts the largest concentration of cropland (27 percent of the nation’s cropland) and 
crop value (23 percent) (Heimlich, 2000).  In addition, all but one program crop, peanuts, is 
grown in the Heartland, thus farmers in this region face growing conditions that enable them to 
maximize profits by changing their crop mix.       
  We also limit the analysis to include only farms where the primary operator claims 
his/her occupation as farm work since farmers that have other sources of income and are farming 
as a hobby or in retirement might engage in a different decision making process.  Lastly, we 12 
restrict our analysis to include only farms with total acres operated greater than zero
5.  It may 
seems counterintuitive to report negative acres operated on a farm, however, land owners may 
rent or lease farm acres to other farmers through a sharecropping or rental agreement; this land is 
then deducted from the total number of acres owned by the primary operator, rented from others, 
or leased from others (ERS, 2003).  Negative total acres operated would therefore suggest that 
more land is being rented out or leased to other producers than operated by the primary operator.  
In that regard, more income may come from renting land than farm production, and hence 
landlords might also engage in a different decision making process.   
Factors affecting agricultural chemical use 
  Given our hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between agricultural chemical 
use and government payments (both coupled and decoupled), we estimate the effects of these 
payments on fertilizers and other agricultural chemical expenditures while controlling for other 
farm and farmer characteristics.  The two dependent variables are adjusted fertilizer expenditures 
per total acres operated (FERT) and adjusted other agricultural chemical expenditures per total 
acres operated (CHEM).  Note agricultural chemicals include all agricultural chemicals not 
classified as fertilizer.  Both dependent variables are adjusted using the producer price index for 
pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical manufacturing
6 to account for inflation.  
While the analysis would be improved by using quantities of fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemicals rather than expenditures, this information is not available.
7 Table 1 summarizes the 
variables used the analysis.   
                                                 
5 This limitation is particularly important as almost all variables are adjusted with respect to total acres operated.  
6 Pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical manufacturing is industry code 3253. 
7 ARMS Phase II does contain data on quantities of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals used, however financial 
data, including information on government payments, is only collected in Phase III.  13 
 
Table 1.  Variables Used in OLS Regression Analysis 
Variable  Definition 
Exp. 
Sign 
FERT  Fertilizer expenditures divided by total acres operated, 
adjusted using PPI 
 
CHEM  Agricultural chemical expenditures divided by total acres 
operated, adjusted using PPI 
 
HBARLEY  Harvested acres of barley divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
HCORN  Harvested acres of corn divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
HCOTTON  Harvested acres of cotton divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
HOATS  Harvested acres of oats divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
HSORGH  Harvested acres of sorghum divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
HSOY  Harvested acres of soybean divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
HWHEAT  Harvested acres of wheat divided by total acres operated  (+ or -) 
ACRESOP  Total acres operated per farm   (+) 
WEALTH  Total farm financial assets less total farm financial debts 
(wealth) per total acres operated, adjusted using CPI 
(+ or -) 
AGE  Age of primary farm operator  (+ or -) 
TENURE  Ratio of owned to operated acres  (+) 




GOV  Government payments less decoupled payments per total acres 
operated, adjusted using CPI 
(+) 
WACF  Weighted average cost of fertilizer, adjusted using PPI
b  (+) 




INSURE  Ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm, 
adjusted using CPI  
(+) 
SOLVE  Ratio of total farm financial debt to total farm financial assets 
(solvency), adjusted using CPI 
(+) 
DP*INSURE  Interaction term: decoupled direct payments & insurance 
expenditures 
(-) 
DP*SOLVE  Interaction term: decoupled direct payments & solvency  (-) 
GOV*INSURE  Interaction term: government payments & insurance  
expenditures 
(-) 
GOV*SOLVE  Interaction term: government payments & solvency  (-) 
TIME  Time trend  (+ or -) 
TIMESQ  Time trend squared   (+ or -) 
COUNTY  County dummy variables  (+ or -) 
Notes: a: Decoupled payments include production flexibility contracts, fixed direct payments, and 
counter-cyclical payments.  b: WACF and WACAC include prices for all seven crops in model. 14 
  Since expenditures on fertilizer and agricultural chemicals are reported at the farm-level 
in the dataset and prices are not reported, it is necessary to construct price measures for these 
inputs.  Weighted average costs of fertilizer (WACF) and agricultural chemicals (WACAC) are 
computed using the following functions. 
(4)     
(5)  
. 
In the first equation,  is the per acre cost of fertilizer for commodity i in time t and is 
multiplied by the ratio of acres harvested of commodity i in time t   to total acres harvested of 
the seven program crops with fertilizer price information in time t  .  Equation (5) is identical 
except  , the per acre cost of agricultural chemicals for commodity i in time t replaces  .  
 and   are adjusted using the producer price index for pesticides, fertilizer, and other 
agricultural chemical manufacturing to account for inflation.  Price data used in WACF and 
WACAC calculations is collected at a regional level from the USDA Economic Research 
Service’s Cost and Returns Report.  WACF and WACAC are used in the regression analysis as a 
measure of prices for fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals, respectively.  We expect an 
increase in WACF will increase FERT and an increase in WACAC will increase CHEM.   
  Harvested acres of the seven program crops used to calculate the weighted average cost 
functions are included in the analysis as independent variables (HBARLEY, HCORN, 
HCOTTON, HOATS, HSORGH, HSOY, and HWHEAT).  These variables are normalized with 
respect to total acres operated hence they represent the farm-level crop mix.  Because the 
variables are normalized, an increase in harvested acres of any one of the seven crops necessarily 15 
changes the crop mix.  Hence, the expected signs of the coefficients on these variables cannot be 
determined.  For example, if HOATS decreases but total acres operated remains the same, these 
acres must have been replaced by another crop or idled; if the replacement crop uses more 
fertilizer and agricultural chemicals per acre, the decrease in HOATS will increase FERT and 
CHEM.  If the acres of oats are replaced with a crop using less fertilizer and agricultural 
chemicals, the relationship will be negative.  Total acres operated (ACRESOP) is also included 
to represent the acreage of non-program crops and as a size control since economies of size may 
be possible.  
Coupled and decoupled direct payments are represented by GOV and DP.  DP includes 
production flexibility contracts, fixed direct payments, and countercyclical payments received by 
farmers.  GOV is calculated as all other government payments.  ARMS and FCRS surveys do not 
always distinguish between coupled payments, such as deficiency payments, and lump sum 
payments such as conservation program payments. Therefore, GOV represents coupled and lump 
sum payments.  Both variables are adjusted using CPI.   
  Several farmer characteristics are also include in the regression model. Wealth 
(WEALTH) measured as total farm financial assets less total farm financial debts per total acres 
operated, adjusted using CPI is included.  As wealth increases, fertilizer and agricultural 
chemical expenditures may increase because more funds are available; this would be particularly 
true at low levels of wealth.  Conversely, since fertilizers and agricultural chemicals may act as 
possible insurance against low yield (Ramaswami, 1992; Hennessy 1998), there is an incentive 
for farmers with low levels of wealth to apply more fertilizers and pesticides.   
  Similarly, the age of the primary operator (AGE) may be positively or negatively related 
to fertilizer and agricultural chemical use. A young operator may be more inclined to minimize 16 
fertilizer and chemical use due to concerns about health and/or the environment, while an older 
operator may be more knowledgeable about crop production and hence use less fertilizer and 
agricultural chemicals.   
The ratio of owned-to-operated acres (TENURE) may affect FERT and CHEM because 
landowners may have a greater incentive to increase yields by increasing their use of production 
inputs.  Furthermore, decoupled direct payments are paid to farm operators, not landowner; 
however an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the payment is capitalized into increased rental rates 
(Kirwan, 2009).  Hence, tenure is an important variable.   
  Two measures of risk are included in the model: INSURE and SOLVE.  INSURE is the 
ratio of insurance costs to total expenditures per farm, adjusted using CPI.  The more risk averse 
a farmer is, the more insurance he may purchase relative to other expenditures.  If fertilizer and 
other agricultural chemicals are risk reducing inputs, then positive relationships between risk 
aversion and the dependent variables are expected.  SOLVE is the solvency ratio measured as 
total farm financial debt to total farm financial assets, adjusted using CPI. Solvency acts as 
measure of financial risk. A farmer that is less solvent may increase the use of risk reducing 
inputs to insure a good yield to avoid defaulting on debt obligations.  Moreover, solvency 
indicates whether a farmer is credit constrained (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006); the more debt a 
farmer has, the less likely he can access more credit.  A positive relationship between SOLVE 
and the dependent variables therefore suggests that financially risky farmers view fertilizer and 
agricultural chemicals as risk reducing inputs and/or decoupled payments relax credit constraints 
thus providing possible coupling mechanism.  Currently there is some debate in the literature 
regarding whether agricultural chemicals are risk reducing or risk increasing (Horowitz & 
Lichtenberg, 1993; Rajsic, Weersink, & Gandorfer, 2009; Ramaswami, 1992).  Our results may 17 
help determine the nature of these inputs.  Four interaction terms are included to allow the effects 
of both government payments and decoupled payments to vary with different levels of risk 
aversion and solvency. 
Since the data spans 17 years, a time trend is included in analysis. A positive relationship 
between the dependent variables and TIME implies that from 1991 to 2008, fertilizer or 
agricultural chemical use has increased over time.  A positive coefficient on TIMESQ would 
imply this is occurring at an increasing rate.  The expected sign of the coefficients on these 
variables is uncertain.  Increased use of plants genetically modified to encourage greater yields 
may reduce the amounts of either production input over time.  On the other hand, increased use 
of low-tillage crop management plans may increase the use of agricultural chemicals because 
more weeds are encouraged to grow on low- or no-till land.   
  Lastly, dummy variables for each county (COUNTY) are included in the model to 
account for variability not captured by the other regressors, specifically: 1) transportation costs 
for volatile fertilizers that may vary across counties, 2) differences in soil and land quality across 
counties, and 3) unobserved growing conditions such as drought and disease that may vary by 
county.   
  The model can be summarized by Equations (6) and (7).  The only differences between 
the equations are the dependent variables and the weighted average cost functions.  Note that 
there is no intercept to allow all county dummies to remain in the model for ease of 
interpretation.  HCROP is a term used to identify harvested acres divided by total acres operated 
of the seven program crops in the model.      18 
(6)     
(7)  
 
Summary statistics   
  Table 3 contains summary statistics of all variables within the model as well as two 
variables that were not included due to endogeneity (net farm income, NINCOME) and missing 
observations in some years (primary operator’s years of farm experience, YEARSEXP).  
Additionally, summary statistics for non-normalized harvested acres of all program crops are 
included (ABARLEY, ACORN, ACOTTON, AOATS, AOILSEED, APEANUT, APULSE, 
ASORGH, ASOY, AWHEAT).  After limited our analysis as described above, the sample 
consisted of 25,571 farms.  
Between 1991 and 2008, average fertilizer expenditures per acres operated (FERT) was 
$16.48, slightly greater than the average agricultural chemical expenditure per acres operated 
(CHEM) of $12.08.  The mean weighted average cost of fertilizer was slightly higher than the 
mean weighted average cost of agricultural chemicals, signifying that fertilizer is on average 
more expensive per acre to apply than agricultural chemicals.  The difference in average 
fertilizer and agricultural chemical expenditures per acre may also come from differences in 
quantities used.  The large standard deviation for both expenditures reflect differences in what 19 
each farm produces; since farms are not homogenous, per acre expenditures for production 
inputs varies dramatically across farms.     
Table  2.  Summary Statistics, 1991-2008 
Variable    Mean    Std. Dev.    Min    Max 
FERT    $16.48    $138.28    $0.00    $358.81 
CHEM    $12.08    $100.05    $0.00    $198.28 
WACF
    $25.40    $76.97    $5.08    $53.58 
WACAC    $16.72    $50.70    $0.66    $60.32 
ABARLEY*    1.93    248.64    0     
ACORN*    224.91    3298.34    0     
ACOTTON*    1.08    384.22    0     
AOATS*    2.09    177.66    0     
AOILSEED*    2.18    337.55    0     
APEANUT*    0.00    0.00    0     
APULSE*    1.35    225.94    0     
ARICE*    0.64    256.03    0     
ASORGH*    4.70    347.36    0     
ASOY*    207.44    2926.94    0     
AWHEAT*    41.05    1706.81    0     
HCORN    0.32    2.24    0    1.00 
HCOTTON    0.001    0.27    0    1.00 
HSORGH    0.01    0.46    0    0.91 
HSOY    0.30    2.09    0    1.00 
HBARLEY    0.002    0.20    0    0.75 
HOATS    0.01    0.27    0    0.64 
HWHEAT    0.04    1.04    0    0.99 
ACRESOP    671.44    8,436.66    1.00     
TENURE    0.56    9.31    0    161.00 
AGE    54    15    17    98 
YEARSEXP*    29.80    14.0    0    75 
WEALTH    $1,198.03    $43,369.70    $(1,240.24)    $315,709.35 
NINCOME*
    $52,295.87    $133,540.57    $(158,312.26)    $2,874,809.57 
INSURE    0.06    0.54    0    0.83 
SOLVE
    0.10    5.68    0    140.34 
DP    $4.88    $73.59    $0.00    $305.25 
GOV    $9.81    $147.76    $(3.71)    $545.34 
Notes: Number of observations is 25,071 except for WACF and WACAC, which have 24,140 
observations, APULSE and AOILSEED, which have 7,214, SOLVE, which has 25,050 observations, and 
YEARSEXP, which has 13,957 observations.  *Some variables are not in the model: YEARSEXP is 
defined as the primary operator’s years of farm experience and NINCOME is defined as net farm 
income.  Crop variables beginning with A (instead of H) are not normalized and represent all program 
crops.  Maximums cannot be reported due to disclosure restrictions on the data.   
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  Total acres operated (ACRESOP) averaged 671.  On average, operators rent 44 percent 
of the acres they operate (TENURE).  The average farm allocates 32 percent of total acres 
operated to corn (HCORN) and 30 percent to soybeans (HSOY).  Furthermore, a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.28 between HCORN and HSOY suggest that farmers harvesting corn 
are likely to harvest soybeans as expected since famers generally produce these two crops 
together or in rotation.  Cotton is only grown in Missouri, with slightly more than 14 acres 
harvested per farm on average.  Note that peanuts are not grown by any farm in the sample.     
  Examining the Pearson correlation coefficients between harvested program crops and the 
dependent variables FERT and CHEM shows that there is a significant 0.52 correlation between 
the percentage of total acres operated that are corn (HCORN) and fertilizer expenditures (FERT) 
as well as a 0.45 correlation between HCORN and agricultural chemical expenditures (CHEM).  
On average corn requires the most fertilizers and agricultural chemicals of any program crop.   
  The average age of the primary farm operator is 54.  On average, the primary operator 
has almost 30 years of experience working on a farm (YEARSEXP). We included only AGE in 
the model as a proxy for farm experience because of the high correlation (0.80) between the two 
variables and the lack of information pertaining to work experience in some of the sample years. 
The mean of wealth adjusted with respect to acres operated to account for farm size is 
approximately $1,200 with a standard deviation of $43,000.  The average net farm income 
(NINCOME) is $52,295.87 and also has a large standard deviation of $133,540.57.  The large 
standard deviations indicate an uneven distribution of wealth and income across the sampled 
farms.  In fact, 74 percent of farms’ total value of production is greater than $100,000 annually.  
On average, farms spend 6 percent of all expenditures on insurance, including subsidized crop 
insurance required to participate in most government crop programs.  The average farm sampled 21 
has a solvency ratio of 0.10, indicating that the farms in the sample have very little debt on 
average. 
  Eighty-eight percent of all sampled farms receive decoupled payments after their 
introduction in 1996.  The average farm collects $5.00 in decoupled direct payments (DP) per 
operated acre and almost twice that in all other government payments (GOV).  Again, there is a 
wide range of farms represented and large standard deviations for both GOV and DP.   
Estimation results   
  Ordinary least squared regression analysis is used to estimate Equations (6) and (7) using 
the appropriate sample weights to test the hypothesis that there exists a positive relationship 
between both decoupled direct payments and other government payments and the use of 
agricultural chemicals.  The resulting coefficients and standard errors are reported in Table 3. 
The effects of the county dummy variables (COUNTY) are not reported due to the large number 
of counties in the sample
8.   
Model 1: Fertilizers (1991 – 2008) 
  All but two variables (WEALTH and GOV*SOLVE) have coefficients that are 
statistically different than zero at a 5 percent level of significance in Model (1).  Harvested acres 
of all program crops per total operated acres were found to have a positive and significant 
relationship with fertilizer expenditures, with harvested corn acreage having the largest 
coefficient and oats having the smallest.  Although precise relationships should not be implied by 
the coefficients, the magnitudes suggest that an increase in acreage allotted to corn will increase 
fertilizer expenditures more than an increase in acreage allotted to oats.  These results reflect the 
important role of crop mix in the consumption of fertilizer.  Total acres operated had a small but 
                                                 
8 There 547 counties in the extended Heartland region. 22 
positive significant relationship with fertilizer expenditures per acre.  These results imply any 
effects due economies of size are small and a farm’s product mix is more important than total 
acreage when determining fertilizer and agricultural chemical expenditures per acre.   
Table 3.  Fertilizer and Agricultural Chemical OLS Regression Results  
    Models 
 
  Fertilizer (1) 
  Other Agricultural 
Chemical (2) 
    Coefficient    Std. Error    Coefficient    Std. Error 
HBARLEY    13.43***    3.84    1.59    2.91 
HCORN    28.70***    0.67    15.77***    0.39 
HCOTTON    16.41***    3.66    35.84***    2.97 
HOATS    6.97**    2.83    -13.72***    2.20 
HSORGH    16.40***    1.76    11.79***    1.31 
HSOY    8.36***    0.72    11.86***    0.37 
HWHEAT    15.24***    1.01    7.94***    0.88 
ACRESOP    0.0005***    0.00009    0.0004***    0.00007 
WEALTH    0.000009    0.00007    0.0003***    0.00006 
DP    0.19***    0.02    0.17***    0.01 
GOV    0.11***    0.01    0.04***    0.01 
AGE    -0.03***    0.01    -0.003    0.004 
TENURE    2.53***    0.21    1.35***    0.15 
WACF/WACAC
a    0.17***    0.02    0.12***    0.03 
INSURE    -23.78***    2.50    -17.98***    1.85 
SOLVE    1.58***    0.55    2.34***    0.41 
DP*INSURE    -0.74***    0.27    -0.57***    0.20 
DP*SOLVE    -0.09**    0.04    -0.20***    0.03 
GOV*INSURE    -0.49***    0.14    0.18*    0.10 
GOV*SOLVE    -0.03    0.04    0.12***    0.03 
TIME    -0.23***    0.06    0.68***    0.04 
TIMESQ    0.02***    0.003    -0.04***    0.003 
Observations    24,118    24,118 
Adjusted R
2     0.399    0.342 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
a: WACF used for Fertilizer model, WACAC used for Other Agricultural Chemical model.  
County dummy variables are not reported due to the large number of counties in the sample.   
  The coefficient on age is negatively significant, indicating that older farmer spend less on 
fertilizer per acre operated than younger farmers.  This supports the proposition that farmers with 
more experience use less fertilizer, perhaps because they are familiar with other methods, or are 23 
reluctant to apply more fertilizer.  Landowners spend more on fertilizer per acre than those that 
rent.  
  The two time trend variables together suggest that over time, fertilizer expenditures have 
decreased at an increasing rate.  This may be due to technological advances in production 
practices such as genetically modified crops that require less fertilizer.   
  The coefficient on INSURE is significantly negative, suggesting more risk averse farmers 
use less fertilizer.  There are two possibilities justifications for this unexpected result.  First, 
some farmers may view fertilizer as a risk-increasing input, meaning that risk-averse farmers 
would decrease their use of fertilizer.  Whether fertilizer is risk-increasing or decreasing is 
debated in the literature.  Second, the percent of total farm expenditures spent on insurance may 
be too simplistic a measure of a farmer’s level of risk aversion, particularly within this model 
where there may be endogeneity issues due to the dependent variable FERT being a portion of 
total expenditures.   
Contrarily, the effect of the proxy for financial risk, SOLVE, is positive and significant.  
If a farmer is less solvent (and therefore has a greater solvency ratio), he will increase his use of 
risk-reducing inputs like fertilizer to insure a good yield and avoid defaulting on debt 
obligations.  Furthermore, SOLVE also serves as a proxy for a farmer’s degree of credit 
constraint and the positive relationship suggests that decoupled direct payments affect a farmer’s 
ability to access credit.   
As hypothesized, an increase in decoupled direct payments and government payments 
both increases fertilizer expenditures by a small but statistically significant amount.  Coupled 
government payments, which make up the majority of payments included in GOV, are based on 
production, inputs, or prices and are known to increase input use.  However, decoupled direct 24 
payments are, in theory, not based on production, inputs, or prices unless they are linked by any 
of the coupling mechanisms previously discussed.  The results for Model (1) suggest that 
decoupled direct payments can influence a farmer’s decision to use fertilizers.   
Expected signs are found for all four interaction-terms included to allow government 
payments and decoupled direct payments to vary with different levels of risk, although the 
interaction between government payments per acre and solvency is not statistically significant.  
The results for DP*INSURE and DP*SOLVE suggest that there are three avenues by which 
decoupled direct payments may affect fertilizer expenditures: first, directly as seen through DP, 
second, indirectly through changes in risk preferences (DP*INSURE), and third, indirectly 
through changes in financial risk preferences (DP*SOLVE).  The marginal effect of government 
payments on fertilizer use calculated at the mean is 0.08.  Since GOV consist of both coupled 
and lump sum transfers, the marginal effect of GOV should be viewed as the lower bound on the 
effect of coupled payments.  The marginal effect of decoupled direct payments on fertilizer use 
evaluated at the mean is 0.14, suggesting that the total effect of DP on FERT is greater than the 
total effect of GOV on FERT. This result is not insignificant.  It suggests that decoupled 
payments can affect the intensive margin more than coupled government payments.   
Model 2: Agricultural Chemicals (1991 – 2008) 
  The results for Model (2) are similar to the results for Model (1).  Only two variables are 
insignificant at 5 percent significance: percent of total acres operated that are barley 
(HBARLEY) and age.  Over time, agricultural chemical expenditures per acre increased at a 
decreasing rate.  Only one variable, ratio of insurance expenditures to total expenditures 
(INSURE), had a coefficient with an unexpected signs, indicating that other agricultural 
chemicals might be a risk-increasing input. 25 
  Contrary to Model (1), the coefficients on HOATS is negative and significantly, 
suggesting that oats require fewer agricultural chemicals to produce than the other program crops 
in the model.  The coefficients associated with the seven program crops differ across crops and 
indicate that crop mix is an important determinant of agricultural chemical use per acre.  For 
example, the coefficient for HCOTTON implies that a 1 percent increase of total acres operated 
used for cotton production increases agricultural chemical expenditures per acre by 
approximately $35.84, while a 1 percent increase of harvested corn acres increase agricultural 
chemical expenditures by $15.77 per acre.  Similar to Model (1), total acres operated is 
statistically significant but small.   
  The effects of government payments (GOV) and decoupled direct payments (DP) on 
agricultural chemical expenditures per acre are positive and small, but statistically significant.  
Furthermore, the coefficients on the interaction terms indicated that government payments affect 
agricultural chemical expenditures per acre through changes in risk preference and/or credit 
constraints.  The marginal effects of government payments on agricultural chemicals decrease 
with an increase in solvency and/or insurance expenditures.  The marginal effects of GOV and 
DP evaluated at the means are 0.06 and 0.11, respectively.   
Structural breaks due to policy change 
  Structural breaks in 1996, 2002, and 2008 are expected due to policy changes in those 
years.  If decoupled direct payments increase fertilizer and agricultural chemical use, a structural 
break should occur in 1996.  If updating alters farmers’ decisions about production inputs, 
specifically fertilizer and agricultural chemicals, a structural break should be found in 2002.  
Because there is no data available after 2008, the hypothesis that changes in the 2008 Farm Bill 
lead to a structural break cannot be tested using this data.  Therefore, Chow tests are conducted 26 
to test for structural breaks at 1996 and 2002 (Chow, 1960).  To test for lags or expectations of 
these policy changes, we also conduct iterative Chow tests (Bai and Perron, 2003).   
Model 3: Fertilizers (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2004) 
  An iterative Chow test suggests that structural breaks occur in Model (1) in 1996 and 
2004.  Thus, there are significant differences within these three subsets of the full model (years 
1991 through 2008) and comparing coefficients across these three subsets indicates which 
characteristics are unique to each subset.  As shown in Table 4, the coefficient for HSOY 
decreases significantly with each subset, going from about 11 in the first subset, then 7 in the 
second subset, and finally 3 in the third subset.  This implies that within each subset, an increase 
in the amount of harvested acres of soybeans increases fertilizer expenditures by less and less.  
Possible causes may be changes in soybean production practices or the type of soybeans used 
due to biotechnology.  The effect of HBARLEY is only significant in the first subset.  Also, the 
effect of HOATS is positive and significant in the first subset and negative in the second subset.   
With the introduction of decoupled direct payments in 1996, the magnitude of the effect 
of government payments decreases.  Between 2004 and 2008, the magnitude of the coefficient on 
GOV remains almost the same, but the magnitude of the coefficient on DP increases, implying 
that after 2004 an increase in decoupled direct payments had a larger impact on fertilizer 
expenditure per acre operated than prior to the enactment of the FSRI Act. Perhaps this is 
because of the introduction of updating.  The marginal effects of government payments evaluated 
at the mean for the three subsets are: 0.21 for 1991 to 1995, 0.07 from 1996-2003, and 0.06 
2004-2008.  The marginal effects of decoupled payments on fertilizer expenditures evaluated at 
the mean also change after 1996: 0.14 from 1996 to 2001 and 0.22 between 2002 and 2008.   
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Table 4.  Fertilizer OLS Regression Results with Structural Breaks in 1996 and 2004 
  1991-1995    1996-2003    2004-2008 











HCORN  27.69***  1.76    26.69***  1.05    39.49***  1.33 
HCOTTON  19.25**  8.56    11.78**  5.10    26.13***  8.74 
HSORGH  19.59***  3.60    13.73***  2.50    24.00***  6.57 
HSOY  11.33***  1.95    6.36***  1.16    1.06  1.50 
HBARLEY  17.52***  6.34    11.52*  7.16    -11.42  17.06 
HOATS  25.86***  6.13    -12.55***  4.31    -9.75  6.20 
HWHEAT  13.17***  2.28    16.12***  1.62    15.82***  2.02 
ACRESOP  0.001***  0.0003    0.0005***  0.001    0.0003**  0.0001 
WEALTH  -0.001***  0.0002    0.001***  0.002    0.0005***  0.0001 
DP  -  -    0.12***  0.03    0.39***  0.04 
GOV  0.29***  0.03    0.09***  0.02    0.09***  0.03 
AGE  -0.05***  0.01    -0.03***  0.01    -0.01  0.01 
TENURE  6.50***  0.52    2.53***  0.39    0.12  0.30 
WACF
 
0.18***  0.07    0.05  0.04    -0.05  0.04 
INSURE  -20.96***  5.44    -26.60***  3.87    -11.96**  5.53 
SOLVE
 
4.31***  1.48    0.97  0.70    9.63***  2.50 
DP*INSURE  -  -    0.45  0.40    -2.68***  0.50 
DP*SOLVE  -  -    -0.11**  0.05    -0.45**  0.18 
GOV*INSURE  -0.87***  0.34    -0.62***  0.18    -0.60  0.46 
GOV*SOLVE  -0.33***  0.09    0.12**  0.05    0.01  0.15 
TIME  0.11  0.54    -4.00***  0.50    3.33  2.87 
TIMESQ  0.04  0.09    0.20***  0.03    -0.07  0.09 
Observations  4,755    9,747    9,616 
Adjusted R
2  0.501    0.408    0.450 
Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  Finding a structural break two years after the FSRI Act was enacted indicates that farmers 
were hesitant to change their on-farm decisions until after they saw how the policy would affect 
them.  If a farmer expects government policies to change regularly, it may be optimal to wait and 
see how the new policy may impact him or her.  Because fertilizer is such an integral part of the 
production of program crops, farmers might be reluctant to change their input decisions.  
However, these conjectures may be unnecessary; an additional Chow test indicates that there is 28 
no statistically significant difference between the model with structural breaks at 1996 and 2002 
and the hypothesized one with breaks at 1996 and 2002
9.   
Model 4: Agricultural Chemicals (Structural Breaks in 1996 & 2000) 
  A similar iterative Chow test for the agricultural chemical model indicates that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the hypothesized model with structural breaks in 1996 
and 2002 and a model with structural breaks in 1996 and 2000
10, shown in Table 5.  The break 
occurring in 2000 instead of 2002 could be due to farmer’s anticipation of new policies.  This 
would be the opposite of what was explained in the previous fertilizer model.   
  However, the most likely cause of this structural break is not policy related.  In 2000, the 
patent for Monsanto’s chemical herbicide Roundup expired, reducing the price of glyphosphate 
(generic Roundup) dramatically and increasing the volume used in the United States (Baccara et. 
al, 2003).  Farmers use this herbicide due to the “broad-spectrum weed control, low cost and 
simplicity” (Shaner, 2000) and have decreased the use of other herbicides in place of using 
glyphosphate.  Most likely, the effects of Roundup dominated any structural break due to policy 
changes in 2002.   
  Each of the seven program crops in the model have similar coefficients to those found in 
Model (2) presented in Table 3, with the exception of HSORGH, which is smaller in magnitude 
in the first subset, but not statistically significant.  Also, the WACAC coefficient is only 
statistically different from zero in the third subset.  This is somewhat surprising as it may suggest 
that the price of agricultural chemicals does not affect total agricultural expenditures per 
operated acres.   
                                                 
9 The F-statistic is 0.858 with a p-value of 1.   
10 The F-statistic is 1.983 with a p-value of 0. 29 
Table 5.  Agricultural Chemical OLS Regression Results with Structural Breaks in 
1996 and 2000     
  1991-1995    1996-1999    2000-2008 











HCORN  15.89***  0.98    12.83***  1.03    14.95***  0.54 
HCOTTON  35.94***  8.00    17.17**  7.90    26.35***  3.97 
HSORGH  3.31  2.88    11.44***  2.87    15.04***  2.66 
HSOY  11.01***  1.00    14.55***  0.94    10.45***  0.49 
HBARLEY  0.49  5.18    -0.45  8.23    1.23  6.34 
HOATS  -11.59**  5.41    0.42  5.27    -9.79***  3.29 
HWHEAT  8.01***  2.44    8.68***  2.45    10.00***  1.21 
ACRESOP  0.00***  0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00***  0.00 
WEALTH  0.00***  0.00    0.00***  0.00    0.00***  0.00 
DP  -  -    0.37***  0.03    0.14***  0.02 
GOV  0.15***  0.02    0.03  0.03    0.01  0.01 
AGE  -0.03***  0.01    -0.02**  0.01    0.01  0.01 
TENURE  2.53***  0.41    1.13**  0.47    0.54***  0.18 
WACAC
 
0.12  0.09    0.23***  0.09    0.20***  0.05 
INSURE  -23.17***  4.37    -14.95***  4.40    -11.70***  2.75 
SOLVE
 
3.75***  1.19    7.19***  1.56    0.39  0.46 
DP*INSURE  -  -    -1.67***  0.45    -0.80***  0.25 
DP*SOLVE  -  -    -0.57***  0.12    -0.04  0.03 
GOV*INSURE  -0.41  0.27    0.41  0.31    0.29**  0.12 
GOV*SOLVE  0.00  0.07    0.12  0.10    0.05  0.03 
TIME  2.56***  0.48    11.81***  2.04    2.13***  0.33 










Note: *, **, *** indicate parameter signiﬁcance at α = 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  Comparing the three subsets, the absence of decoupled direct payments is evident before 
1996.  After their introduction at that time, a positive and statistically significant relationship is 
found between DP and agricultural chemical expenditures per acre.  In the second subset, the 
effects of both interaction terms with DP are negative and significant.  The effect of other 
government payments is negative in the second subset (1996-2001) but not significant.  
Otherwise, the effects of government payments per operated acre are similar to those found in 30 
Model (2).  However, the interaction terms show a weaker relationship in all three subset than in 
Model (2).  GOV*INSURE is only significant between 1996 and 2001 and GOV*SOLVE is not 
significant in any of the three models.  The marginal effects of government payments per acre 
operated for the three subsets are: 0.13 for 1991-1995, 0.07 for 1996-1999, and 0.34 2000-2008.  
The marginal effects of decoupled payments per acre operated after 1996 are 0.22 for 1996-1999 
and 0.09 for 2000-2008.  
  The time trend variables are significant in the first two subsets, suggesting that between 
1991 and 1999, agricultural chemical expenditures have increased at a decreasing rate. 
IV.  Implications and Conclusions 
  Truly decoupled payments should not affect a farmer’s optimal allocation of acreage or 
inputs since these payments are based on historic production and yields rather than current 
production, prices or inputs.  However, several mechanisms that cause decoupled payments to 
become coupled have been identified in the literature.  One mechanism by which decoupled 
payments become coupled, and thus may impact current production decisions, is through 
expectations of future policy changes.  If a farmer believes that he might be able to update his 
base acreage and/or yield in the future either through policy changes or the implicit policy design 
(in the case of ACRE), then he has incentive to alter his production decision in the current period 
in order to maximize future profits and his expected utility.  Since the introduction of decoupled 
payments in 1996, updating has been allowed in both subsequent Farm Bills.   
  Therefore, we expected a positive relationship between the use of agricultural chemicals 
and decoupled payments.  Although we expected the relationships between both decoupled and 
coupled governments payments and agricultural chemical use to be positive, the magnitude of 
the effect of decoupled direct payments relative to the magnitude of the effect of coupled 31 
government payments depends on the levels of coupled price supports, decoupled subsidies, and 
the discount rate.  
  Using annual cross-sectional data weighted ordinary least squares regression results 
indicate positive relationships between both decoupled government payments and other 
government payments and the expenditures of fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals (which 
includes all other agricultural chemicals not classified as fertilizer) per acres operated. Since we 
controlled for price movements and adjusted expenditures using the appropriate PPI, we assume 
that these relationships indicate positive relationships between government payments and 
agricultural chemical use.   
Between 1996 and 2004 the marginal effect of decoupled payments on fertilizer 
expenditures per acres operated evaluated at the mean was 0.14, after 2004 this figure increased 
to 0.22.  Relative to the marginal effects of other government payments on fertilizer expenditures 
per acres operated for the same time periods, decoupled direct payments increased fertilizer 
expenditures by 2 or 3 times as much.  Similar results hold for other agricultural chemicals 
between 1996 and 2000.  After 2000, the marginal effects of other government payments on 
agricultural chemicals were close to 4 times greater than those for decoupled direct payments.  
Collectively, the results indicate that decoupled payments may affect the intensive margin more 
that other types of government payments and hence might lead to greater production distortions.  
Since other government payments consisted of both coupled and lump sum transfers, the 
marginal effects other government payments should be viewed as the lower bound on the 
marginal effects of coupled payments.  However, since coupled payments made up the majority 
of the transfers categorized as other government payments, there is some evidence that 
decoupled payments may affect the intensive margin more than coupled payments.   32 
  Although impacts of the newest decoupled direct payment program, Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE), on production decisions could not be tested empirically, an important 
implication comes from the theoretical section.  The ACRE program introduced in 2008 set 
historic yields to an Olympic moving average, meaning that each year the historic period upon 
which payments are calculated changes.  Therefore, this policy may implicitly create a link 
between current acreage and input decisions and future program crop payments and hence ACRE 
payments become coupled.   
  To more fully understand the link between decoupled payments, updating and 
agricultural chemical use more research is needed.  First, the lack of panel data prevents tracking 
of year to year changes in a specific farmer’s production decisions.  Panel data would grant a 
better understanding of how both the extensive and intensive production margins are impacted 
by policy changes.  Second, future research should aim to further separate other government 
payments into lump sum transfers and coupled payments.  Lastly, quantities of fertilizer and 
agricultural chemicals per acre should be used in the analysis rather farm-level total 
expenditures.  Quantity data could also be used to determine how decoupled direct payments 
affect environmental quality by examining the use of particularly environmentally hazardous 
fertilizer and agricultural chemicals.   
 33 
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